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1. Introduction
Notwithstanding the development of markets and diﬀerent ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries, banks maintain their central role in the economic systems and thus the
problems related to their activities and performances are the focus of a large
body of literature. The aim of this paper is to look at the the eﬃciency of the
Italian banking system taking into account the role that the quality of banking
credit may play at a microeconomic level.
The quality of credit is a known critical issue in the literature where it is rec-
ognized that three diﬀerent aspects, relating to macroeconomic, competition and
banking supervision issues, matter for its relevance. As for the ﬁrst aspect, one
needs to recognize that the ﬁnancial structure of an economy plays a key role in
the allocation of resources and bank credit is a main connection with the real sec-
tor. Furthermore, bank credit is still considered special in gathering information
and monitoring borrowers, so that ﬁnancing through ﬁnancial markets cannot be
seen as a perfect substitute for it. Moreover, the cost and the availability of bank
credit aﬀects heavily investment choices both with respect to ﬁrms ﬁnancial struc-
ture and in relation to the structure of household ﬁnancial portfolios and banking
liabilities. This point is particularly important and relevant for bank-based eco-
nomic systems, such as in many European continental countries and especially in
Italy (Gambacorta, 1998; ECB, 2003).
∗Corresponding author: angelo.zago@univr.itRelated to these considerations, we can also highlight that the quality of credit
is as important as its availability and cost for both resource allocation and growth,
p l a y i n gas p e c i ﬁc role in these processes. The models of delegated monitoring and
liquidity creation emphasize precisely the role of banks in the evaluation of credit
worthiness and in the resource allocation; they also point out the beneﬁcial eﬀects
of this type of banking activity in guaranteing stability and conﬁdence in the
payment system. As a consequence, poor credit quality, often a synonymous of
excessive credit risk, may cause a greater volatility in the total credit with possible
backward linkages to the same banking system. Indeed, the recent literature on
ﬁnance and growth1 highlights the importance of the access to ﬁnancing for ﬁrms
depending heavily from the external ﬁnance, even if the speciﬁce ﬀects of the
legal framework and of the structure of ﬁnancial and banking systems are not
unambiguously clear (Claessens and Leaven 2005).
At the macroeconomic level then, problem loans may be a signal of a wrong
allocation of credit which may cause a decrease of the funds available for good
and safer investments. Moreover, problem loans inﬂu e n c ee x p e c t e dl o s s e sa n d
so they may inﬂuence the state of the economic cycle causing a reduction in the
supply of loans or changing the perception of depositors about the risks that banks
take (Bernuer and Kubi, 2004). On the other hand, the same economic cycle or
macroeconomic risks may inﬂuence the quality of credit indipendently from banks’
behaviour, and it is likely that riskier borrowers, by type of agent or by sector of
activity, may be aﬀected more heavily even by general shocks thus inducing more
pronounced eﬀects for the involved banks.
The globalization of ﬁnancial markets, the increasing competition and the new
activities carried out by banks do not diminish the importance of credit risk for
growth and stability among the diﬀerent risks characterizing banking activities.2
Even if macroeconomic instability has always been a major factor for banking
crises (Basel Committee, 2004), the issue of borrowers selection, and therefore of
credit quality is an important instrument or an intermediate target for regulators
in order to dampen possible crisis. In fact, the quality of credit is the focus of
1See, e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1998, Levine, Loayazas and Beck 2000, Leahy et al. 2001,
Levine 2003, Guiso and Iappelli 2004.
2For example, on the stability and the risks of the European banking systems, in 2002 the
ECB pointed out the changes in the banks’ risk proﬁle in Europe with a relative more weight
of market risk and non traditional risks, such as strategic, legal and reputation risks, following
the shifts in banks’ business activities (ECB, 2002). The report for 2004 highlights again the
relevance of managing and monitoring credit risk in economic downturns and during periods of
cyclical and structural changes (ECB, 2004).
2the Basel reform in the banking supervision system on the relationship between
credit and operative risk and capital requirements.
Following the ﬁrst Basel agreement, banks used to get rid oﬀ assets with rel-
atively high capital requirements from balance sheets even if they contributed
very little to portfolio credit risk. Under the new approach to capital regulation,
however the Basel Supervisors Committee aim to induce regulatory capital and
economic capital as close as possible, and this requirement takes into account all
the determinants of portfolio credit risk. So, inadequate assessment of loan loss
provisions could be reﬂected in the amount of capital needed to absorb expected
losses as well as the unexpected ones.
Last but not least, credit quality is a major instrument in banking competition
t ot h ee x t e n tt h a tc r e d i tq u a l i t ym a yl e a dt oa ne ﬃcient cost structure. A bad
credit screening indeed makes the bank’s lending subject to the winner’s curse
(Freixas and Rochet, 1997), particularly given that credit screening is poorly
correlated among an increasing number of banks (Shiﬀer, 1997).
Quality of credit is then a speciﬁc signal of the soundness of the banking sector
as excessive credit risk could impair the eﬃcient allocation of capital but bad credit
may also impair the performance of banking institutions. Indeed, some authors
argue that a signiﬁcant relationship is to be found between the eﬃciency of the
banking system and economic growth, and at the same time the eﬃciency of the
borrowing ﬁrms could inﬂuence the performance of the banking system (Lucchetti
et al. 2001, Lozano-Vivas and Pastor 2003).
These considerations lead to the main questions of this paper. Do high levels of
problem loans usually seen as a signal of the ﬁnancial distress of a bank necessarily
imply bank’s ineﬃciency? Can its quality be considered a speciﬁc characteristic
of credit, and how can one capture its eﬀects on bank’s eﬃciency? To answer
these and related questions, in this study we estimate banks’ technical eﬃciency
taking into account problem loans by using directional distance functions. These
are a generalization of the radial distance functions which, since Shephard’s con-
tributions, have been used to give a single-valued representation of production
relations in case of multiple inputs and multiple outputs (Chambers, Chung and
Färe 1996 and 1998).
U s i n gd i r e c t i o n a ld i s t a n c ef u n c t i o n si ti sp o s i s b l et oc r e d i tb a n n k sf o rt h e i r
eﬀorts to increase outputs and decrease the problem loans. We indeed ﬁnd that
the technical eﬃciency of banks increase on c ew er e c o g n i z et h e i re ﬀorts to reduce
problem loans. The next section reviews the literature that addresses the issue of
how to take into account problem loans in the production process and eﬃciency
3evaluation of banks. Then we introduce the notation, the model and the empirical
algorithms we use in the study. In section ﬁve we illustrate the data we use and
discuss the results. Section six concludes the paper with the suggestions for further
research work.
2. Review of the literature
Before reviewing the main ﬁndings of the rather scattered evidence on bad or non
performing loans in the literature about banking eﬃciency, let us ﬁrst notice two
general problems with the empirical evaluation of credit risk using balance sheets
data: the deﬁnition of non performing loans (Bloem and Gorter, 2001), and their
characteristic of being an ex-post measure of credit risk.3 As for the ﬁrst problem
the main drawback is that non performing loans are, usually, diﬀerent type of loans
which can be classiﬁed by quantitative criteria, e.g., number of days of overdue
scheduled payments, or qualitative criteria (management judgement, information)
or both. This makes more diﬃcult the comparison between diﬀerent countries but
also the choice of the speciﬁc items from the balance sheets to be considered for
the analysis. The second problem, on the other hand, may impair the results
and the interpretation of the analysisa sp r o b l e ml o a n sa r eac o n s e q u e n c eo fa
preceding activity of selection of the creditworthiness, the rate of decay of loans
but also of the bankruptcy laws that may inﬂuence the explicit impact of the
credit risk on banks.
The paper of Berger and De Young (1997) is the central one for the discus-
sion of the channels through which problem loans may inﬂuence banks’ eﬃciency.
They ﬁnd a negative relationships between cost eﬃciency and risk in failed banks.
Observing that failing institutions have larger proportions of non performing loans
and that average institution incurs high costs and low proﬁts relative to institu-
tions of best practice, they test diﬀerent hypothesis to describe the intertemporal
relationship among problem loans, cost eﬃciency and ﬁnancial capital. They call
‘Bad luck’ when loan quality problems may arise after events beyond the control
of the bank’s management, while ‘Bad management’ relates the quality of the
a s s e t st ot h ep e r f o r m a n c e so ft h em a n a g e m e n tw h om a yh a v ep o o rs k i l l si nc r e d i t
scoring or diﬃculties in monitoring and controlling borrowers. Their ‘Skimping
3A further important problem about quality evaluation is that “..nonperforming loans is an
ex post measure of quality rather than ex ante measure as not all low quality loans end up being
nonperforming loans, and not all loans that are performing well today will continue to do so in
th efuture...” (Hughes and Mester 1993: ).
4hypothesis’ explains the relationships as a bank’s trade-oﬀ between short term
operating costs and future loan performance problems and their ‘Moral hazard
hypothesis’ explains the incentives to take more risks by a bank with low level of
capital. Their analysis suggest that cost eﬃciency may be an important indicator
of future problel loans and problem banks.
Before their study few papers had explicitly taken into account the relation-
ships between credit risk and eﬃciency. Given that bad loans, or non performing
loans, are still the preferred variable for the quality of credit, loan losses provi-
sions being the second one,4 the main diﬀerence lays in the role they perform in
the diﬀerent models. So the consideration of managers’ trade oﬀs between risk
and return allowing for the possibility of non-risk neutrality, leads to the inclusion
of non performing loans as an indicator of underlying ﬁnancial conditions of the
bank in addition to ﬁnancial capital, usually in a cost function context (Hughes
et al. 1996).
Hughes and Mester (1993) are among the ﬁrst to specify loans by diﬀerent
product lines, as a ﬁrst step to take account of risk, adding non performing loans
as a quality measure for total outputs. Charnes et al. (1990), instead considers
loan loss provision as an additional input together with actual loan losses. A
feature of some of these studies is the attempt to estimate eﬃciency controlling
for the credit risk as an environmental variable which inﬂuence the performance
of the banks.
Recently, Pastor (1999, 2002) adopts a diﬀerent estimation procedure referring
speciﬁcally to the bad management hypothesis. Provision for loan losses are again
used as an indicator of the credit risk, but the aim of the paper is to decompose
the component due to bad luck from the one due to the bad management hypoth-
esis. The focus of credit risk is always on the input side but with more explicit
relationship to the speciﬁc bank performance.
Ad i ﬀerent approach to the problem can be found in Berg et al. (1992) and
Resti (1994). Even if they both do not consider non performing loans as a speciﬁc
output, they include them as a factor by which to adjust total loans in order
to get a more correct measure of the traditional output of banks. In Berg, in
particular loan losses are introduced with negative sign in the output vector,5
4Hughes and Mester (1993) underline that loan loss provisions is an inferior measure of quality
as it may be set strategically by the banks or by regulators.
5Within the value added approach, the authors take into account three outputs: short term
loans, long term loans, and non bank deposits, while the negative loan losses are interpreted as
indicators of the quality of the loans.
5whereas Resti considers directly only performing loans in his output vector, i.e.,
total loans net of problem loans. However, notice that this approach does not allow
the consideration of non performing loans as a decision variable of the banks as
other studies recommend, e.g., Pastor.
Ad i ﬀerent but somewhat related strand of literature deals with the environ-
mental impacts in the measurement of eﬃciency and productivity growth. Färe
et al. (1989) indeed started what has become now a relatively vast literature
extending eﬃciency measurement when some outputs are undesirable. 6 The
central notion of this paper, and of many that followed (for a recent application
and partial survey see Ball et al., 2001), is that of weak disposability of outputs.
To credit ﬁrms or industries for their eﬀort to cut oﬀ on pollutants, technology is
modeled so that it can handle the case when the reduction of some (bad) outputs
requires the reduction of some of the other outputs and/or the increase of inputs.
Besides the concept of output weak disposability, an interesting and useful idea
for our setting is the directional distance function, a generalization of the radial
distance function introduced to production economics by Chambers, Chung and
Färe (1996) who extended and adapted the idea of the translation functions of
Kolm (1976) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1980), and of the beneﬁt function
introduced in consumer theory by Luenberger (1992, 1994). The directional dis-
tance function allows to compare diﬀerent ﬁrms and to measure their distance
from the frontier of the technology moving along a preassigned direction. In this
f a s h i o ni ti sp o s s i b l et oe v a l u a t et h ep e r f o r m a n c eo ft h eﬁr m st h a tn e e dt oi n c r e a s e
the production of the good outputs and decrease that of bad outputs (Chung, Färe
and Grosskopf, 1999).
The ﬁrst attempt to use the directional distance function to take into account
the quality of outputs in a diﬀerent context, i.e., health services, is a paper by
Dismuke and Sena (2001). They consider the mortality rate as a (bad) quality
attribute of the hospital production process and use directional distance functions
to calculate a Luenberger-Malmquist productivity index. They are then able to
decompose the productivity index into a quality index, plus a technical change
and eﬃciency change components. In this paper we use the idea of the directional
distance function to incorporate credit quality into the technology and thus we
can estimate bank’s eﬃciency taking into account credit risk.
6The ﬁrst contribution that takes into account bad outputs is probably the work of Pittman
(1983), who extends the approach of CCD, speciﬁes a modiﬁe dT o r n q v i s to u t p u ti n d e xa n du s e s
dual data on pollutants’ shadow prices to adjust the revenue shares.
63. Notation and model speciﬁcation
In this study we treat the problem loans as a bad output. Indeed, the production of
“good” outputs, such as loans and non interest income, is typically accompanied
by the joint production of undesirable “bad” outputs, such as the bad or non
performing loans. This implies that the reduction of the bad output can come
only at a cost: either a reduction in the good outputs or the use of more resources.
More formally, let x ∈ <N
+ be a vector of inputs that can be used to obtain a set
of desiderable outputs, denoted by y ∈ <M
+ , and a vector of undesirable outputs,
b ∈ <H










+ b ∈ <
H
+):x can produce (y,b)
ª
.
In words, the technology consists of all outputs - good and bad - that are feasible
for some input vector. T satisﬁes the following properties (Chambers, 2002):
T.1: T is closed;
T.2: Inputs and outputs are freely disposable, i.e., if (x0,−y0,−b0) ≥ (x,−y,−b)
then (x,y,b) ∈ T ⇒ (x0,y0,b 0) ∈ T;
T.3: Doing nothing is feasible, i.e., (0N,0M,0H) ∈ T.
Related to T are the input set, V (y,b)={x :( x,y,b) ∈ T}, and the output
set, P(x)={(y,b):( x,y,b) ∈ T}. For our purposes, i.e., to model the properties
of joint production of desirable and undesirable outpus, we ﬁnd more convenient
to use the output set, which represents all feasible output vectors (y,b) for a given
input vector x. We assume the standard properties of the output set, such as
the axioms of possibility of inaction, no free lunch, the free disposal or strong
disposability of the good outputs and the inputs. In addition, we assume that the
output set is a convex and compact set.
We model the idea that reduction of bads is costly, i.e., the weak disposability
of undesirable outputs, as:
(y,b) ∈ P(x) and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 imply (θy,θb) ∈ P(x),
menaing that a reduction in bads is feasible only if goods are simultaneously
reduced, given a ﬁxed level of inputs. In addition, the notion that the good
outputs are jointly produced with the bads is modelled by
if (y,b) ∈ P(x) and b =0 then y =0 .
In words, this last equation says that the good outputs are “null-joint” with
the bad outputs if the only way to produce no bads is by producing zero good
7outputs. Alternatively, this means that if a good output is produced in a positive
amount some bad output must also be produced (Färe et al. 2005).
The directional technology distance function generalizes both input and ouput
Shephard’s distance functions, usually calculated for eﬃciency estimation pur-
poses, and provides a complete representation of the technology. When bad
outputs are present, following Chambers, Chung, and Färe (1996, 1998), and
Chambers (2002), it can be deﬁned as:
− →
DT(x,y,b;gx,g y,g b)=max{β ∈ < :( x − βgx,y+ βgy,b − βgb) ∈ T},
gx ∈ <
N
+,g y ∈ <
M
+ ,g b ∈ <
H




if (x − βgx,y + βgy,b − βgb) ∈ T for some β and dT(y,b,gy,g b)= inf{δ ∈ < :
(y+δgy ∈ <M
+ ,b −δgb ∈ <H
+)} otherwise. Note that (gx,g y,g b) is a reference vector
of inputs and outputs which determines the direction over which the distance
function is determined.
− →
DT(x,y;gx,g y,g b) represents the maximal translation of
the input and output vector in the direction of (gx,g y,g b) that keeps the translated
input and output vector inside T.
The properties of the directional distance function are the following (Luen-
berger 1992, 1994, 1995; Chambers, Chung, and Färe 1995, 1996):
1.
− →
DT(x − αgx,y+ αgy,b + αgb;gx,g y,g b)=
− →
DT(x,y,b;gx,g y,g b) − α;
2.
− →






DT(x,y;gx,g y,g b), λ>0;
4. (y0 ≥ y, b0 ≥ b)= ⇒
− →
DT(x,y0,b 0;gx,g y,g b) ≤
− →
DT(x,y,b;gx,g y,g b);
5. x0 ≥ x =⇒
− →
DT(x0,y,b;gx,g y,g b) ≥
− →
DT(x,y,b;gx,g y,g b);
6. if T is convex,
− →
DT(x,y,b;gx,g y,g b) is concave in (x,y,b).
As shown by Chambers, Chung, and Färe (1996), all known (radial) distance
and directional distance functions can be depicted as special cases of the direc-
tional technology distance function. One example, which will be used in this
paper is the directional output distance function (Chambers, Chung, and Färe
1998), which can be deﬁned as:
− →
DO(x,y,b;0
N,g y,g b)=max{β ∈ < :( x, y + βgy,b − βgb) ∈ T}, (3.1)
gy ∈ <
M




if (x, y+βgy,b −βgb) ∈ T for some β and +∞ otherwise.
− →
DO(x,y,b;0 N,g y,g b)
represents the maximal translation of the output vector in the direction of (gy,g b)
8that keeps the translated output vector inside T. In other words, it seeks for the
maximum attainable expansion of desirable outputs in the gy direction and the
largest feasible contraction of the undesirable or bad outputs in the gb direction.
Notice that under the assumption of output free disposability, the directional out-
put distance function is a complete representation of the technology (Chambers,
Chung, and Färe 1998):
− →
DO(x,y,s;0,g y,g b) ≤ 0 ⇔ (y,b) ∈ P(x).
This function is equal to zero when the observed productive plan is located on
the boundary of the output set, i.e., it is eﬃcient. Other relevant properties are
found in Chambers et al. (1998).
3.1. Activity analysis and empirical implementation
For the estimation of the production technology, parametric and non-parametric
methodologies are available. Among these latter, Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) employs linear programming to construct a piecewise linear representation
of the frontier technology.7 DEA constructs a convex hull around the observed
inputs and outputs of the ﬁrms in the sample. In the output space, for instance,
DEA traces the transformation curve of the outputs that can be produced with a
certain level of inputs. With DEA, the inputs-outputs observed in a sample can
then be used to measure the distance of each observation from the frontier, and
the distance function measures are then employed for the calculation of technical
eﬃciency.
Although no speciﬁc functional forms are assumed, the shape of the production
frontier is inﬂuenced by the assumptions regarding the returns to scale and the
disposability of inputs and outputs. Constant returns to scale (CRS) means that
an increase of inputs leads to a proportional increase in the outputs. On the other
hand, variable returns to scale (VRS) implies that an increase in inputs leads to
a non proportional increase in outputs, with an initial tract in which returns are
increasing and then with decreasing returns. As other possibilities, the technology
could have non-decreasing returns (NDRS) or non-increasing returns (NIRS).
Using the techniques of activity analysis, various technologies can be con-
structed from the K observed, feasible activities. DEA allows also to evaluate the
7DEA is deterministic and does not impose any functional form on the technology. For a
comparison of strenghts and weaknesses of diﬀerent methods the reader can refer to Lovell (1993)
and Murillo-Zamorano (2004).
9distance of each ﬁrm in the sample from the best practice frontier. The distance
from diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the technology represents a measure of the techni-
cal eﬃciency of production units.8 Referring to a technology with constant returns
to scale (CRS), the linear program problem to solve to compute the directional




N,g y,g b)=m a xβ :
K X
k=1
zkykm ≥ yk0m + βgy,m=1 ,...,M, (3.2)
K X
k=1
zkbkh ≥ bk0h − βgb,h=1 ,...,H,
K X
k=1
zkxkn ≤ xk0n,n=1 ,...,N,
zk ≥ 0,k=1 ,...,K,
where gy and gb are the direction vectors for the good and bad outputs respecively.
In this study we will consider diﬀerent direction vectors for gy and gb,b u ta
benchmark direction is given by gy = y0 and gb = −b0, i.e., in the direction of the
observations, with the minus sign for the case of the bad outputs. In this case,
also imposing weak disposability on the bad outputs, the linear programme to








0)=m a xβ :
8The radial distance functions àl aShephard is related to the technical eﬃciency àl aFarrell
by the following: θ = 1
DO(x,y,s),w h e r eθ is the Farrell technical eﬃciency and DO(x,y,s) is the
radial Shephard measure deﬁned in the text (see, e.g., Färe and Primont, 1995).
10K X
k=1
zkykm ≥ yk0m(1 + β),m=1 ,...,M, (3.3)
K X
k=1
zkbkh = bk0h(1 − β),h=1 ,...,H,
K X
k=1
zkxkn ≤ xk0n,n=1 ,...,N,
zk ≥ 0,k=1 ,...,K,
3.2. Speciﬁcation of banking production
The ﬁrst and unavoidable problem when dealing with the speciﬁcation of the
banking production is the correct deﬁnition of banking outputs and inputs. The
agrred consideration of the bank as a multi-ouput multi-input ﬁrm leads however
to the argiung among economists over the problem of what has to be considered
output or input and how to measure them. There is a clear lack of consensus about
a common solution to these problems and even in the criteria of classiﬁcation of the
diﬀerent approaches currently used.9 Brieﬂy and broadly speaking, the approaches
in the literature are the intermediation and the asset approach, where banks are
seen as ﬁnancial intermediaries and the main diﬀerence between them is in the
focusing on the specialty of the banks over the other ﬁnancial institutions; the
production approach, in which banks are seen as producers of ﬁnancial services
(loans and deposits), and the value added approach, which emphasize the value
added in the balance sheets to identify the outputs.
More speciﬁcally, the main diﬀerence between the intermediation or asset ap-
proach and the production and value added approaches lays in the treatment of
deposits. While they are considered a typical input for their intermediation func-
tion, they are considered a service to the customers likewise the loans by th evalue
9The classiﬁcation criteria can draw from the macroeconomic point of view of the functions
of the banks which transform and transfer resources from the units in surplus to those in deﬁcit
(intermediation and asset approach) or from a microeconomic point of view for which banks are
producers of ﬁnancial services (production approach). Alternatively, the diﬀerent approaches
may be split between their relationships to the functions carried out by the banks (intermedi-
ation, asset and production approach) or on the sources of revenue (user cost and value added
approach). See, among others, Berger et al. 1993, Berger and Humprey 1997, Fixler and Zi-
eschang 1992.
11added and production approach. As far as we know, there are only few attempts
to compare directly the results of diﬀerent approaches,10 and at any rate the ev-
idence reported does not discriminate about the diﬀerent ones. In other words,
more often than not data availability, the aim of the analysis and the estimation
methods have been the important criteria guiding the choice on the approach to
be used.
A larger consensus has been reached on how to measure the variables to con-
sider: in general it is common practice to use stock variables, unlike the analysis
done for other sectors when ﬂow variables are more common. The main reason
for this choice is a substantial proportionality between stock and ﬂow variables in
the banking production, given that deposits and loans need a continuous ﬂow of
work independently of the demand (Humphrey, 1992).
A further point of discussion follows from the evolution and the modiﬁcations
of diﬀerent approaches due to the development of the vast literature on banks’
eﬃciency and performance evaluation. The changes in the structure of the ﬁnan-
cial systems and the changing role of banks in a more competitive environment
have created the need to adapt the diﬀerent models to the new reality. Therefore,
within the same approaches diﬀerent output and input categories have been mod-
iﬁed in relationships with the changing structure of the bank balance sheets or
to take into account country speciﬁc conditions of the banks (Cavallo and Rossi,
2002).
As for the value added approach,11 the distinguishing characteristic is the
consideration of the changes in the technology of banking production, following
the distinction between important outputs and non important, or intermediate,
outputs. This brings about the inclusion of purchased deposits (non transaction
deposits) or another indicator for the costs of raising loanable funds. Likewise,
the intermediation and asset approaches extend the inputs looking for the items
on the liability side which characterize the intermediation function of the banks.
10Actually the main papers are Favero and Papi (1995) and Tortosa-Ausina (2002). However,
notice that the ﬁrst compares the intermediation and asset approaches ﬁnding their results
robust to the modiﬁcation of the speciﬁcation of banking production, whereas this is not true
for Tortosa-Ausina who test the data using the value added and the intermediation approaches.
An explanation could be that only in the latter paper there is a comparison of diﬀerent views
of the banking ﬁrm.
11The production approach is rarely applied since it needs quantities (number of loan oper-
ations, of cash withdrawals etc.) and not nominal variables. Likewise the direct application of
the user cost (Fixler and Zieschang 1992) is discouraged by the diﬃculty to ﬁnd out appropriate
data for the opportunity cost to compare outputs and inputs.
12As p e c i ﬁcc o n s i d e r a t i o nm a yb eg i v e nt oﬁnancial capital as an important and
expensive source of funds and as a protection against risks of bank’s asset portfolio
(MacAllister and Manus 1993, Berger and Mester 1997).
As for the output side of production function, both approaches share an in-
creasing consideration of the multi-output characteristic of the bank production
and the inclusion of non traditional activities of the banks. Securities and bonds,
liquid and other earning assets and non interest income are a common addition
in most part of the literature. The inclusion of the oﬀ-balance sheets activities
is less common, even if letters of credit and derivatives are becoming increasingly
important in banking (Rogers 1998, Stiroh 2000),12 b u tu pt on o wt h e i rw e i g h ti s
relatively low in the balance sheet accounts, except for the large banks so the bias
might not be too large if these items are omitted.
4. Data and preliminary results
In this paper, where the role of the good and bad credit in the eﬃciency of the
banks is the focus of the analysis, we test the hypothesis with two approaches,
the value added and the intermediation approach, with data obtained from ABI,
the Italian Association of Banks. The choice of the variables is made following
the results largely accepted in the literature even at the cost of some oversimpliﬁ-
cation of the activities of the Italian banking ﬁrms so to point out the persistent
importance of the traditional loan activity and the distinction of diﬀerent type of
loans according to their quality in terms of the risk of credit.
As for the value added approach, the outputs we consider are the loans to
non ﬁnancial agents (real estate, commercial industrial and personal loans), with
the distinction between good loans and problem loans (either bad loans or non
performing loans),13 deposits with retail customers, and non interest income as a
proxy for the bank’s services in non lending activities. The choice of non interest
income versus, or besides, securities seems more appropriate as it represents the
result of trading and investment activities in securities and bonds. Labor (number
12Omitting non traditional outputs tend to understate proﬁte ﬃciency. OBS are included as
output in Casu et al. (2003) whereas in Färe et al. (1999) they are included as a quasi ﬁxed
input following the work of Berger and Mester (1997): “.. oﬀ balance sheet items are included
in the model because they are often substitutes for directly issued loans ..”. Notice however,
that OBS are becoming increasingly a system of transfer of risks.
13As for non performing loans, the larger item of total non performing loans instead of the
narrower concept of bad loans seem more representative of non good loans as this type of
classiﬁcation entails diﬀerent admistrative and monitoring procedures for the bank.
13of employees) and capital (not only physical but also also intangibles to include
the increasing importance of reputation and legal aspects ) are the inputs which
better capture the technology for the production of the loans.
In the intermediation model outputs and inputs are chosen according to the
modiﬁed version which allows for the production of the services of payments by the
banks. Therefore outputs are loans (again divided between good and bad loans),
non interest income and core deposits (transaction deposits) whereas purchased
deposits are among the inputs together with labor (total costs in this case) and
capital.
Descriptive statistics for the data are presented in table 1. We are using the
observations that have reliable data for all the balance sheets items used as proxies
for inputs and outputs. In addition, to ensure that the null-jointness property
hold, we keep only the observations that have a positive amount of problem loans.
Notice that the number of banks change every year and so it is diﬃcult to compare
eﬃciency scores across years.
Since in this study we concentrate on the impact of credit quality, for each
year we estimate the directional output distance function and hence technical
eﬃciency using diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the loans. In speciﬁcation 1, which can
be considered our benchmark, we use only the total loans together with the other
(good) outputs. In speciﬁcation 2, following Resti (1994), we use loans net of the
bad loans (2A) or net of the non performing loans (2B). Thus in speciﬁcation 1
and 2A-2B we have only good outputs.
In speciﬁcation 3, on the other hand, we explicitly take into account the prob-
lem loans, and credit those banks that try to reduce them using a directional
distance function in which ﬁrm simultaneously try to increase the good outputs
and try to reduce the problem loans. These latter can be the bad loans (speciﬁ-
cation 3A) or the non performing loans (3B).
I nt a b l e2( t a b l e3 )w er e p o r te ﬃciency scores using the value added (inter-
mediation) approach for the diﬀerent years. Notice that a value of zero would
imply that the observation is located in the frontier, i.e., the maximum technical
eﬃciency, while higher values indicate that the performance is lower. Looking at
the results, one can notice that the speciﬁcation 1, 2A and-2B give very similar
results. Speciﬁcation 3A and 3B, on the other hand, give diﬀerent results from
the other speciﬁcations consistently across years and approaches (value added and
intermediation). This seems to suggest that just using total loans net of problem
loans, as suggested for instance in Resti (1994), does not credit ﬁrms for their
eﬀorts to reduce the problem loans. In addition, the results show that credit-
14ing ﬁrms for reducing problem loans increases signiﬁcantly their performances, as
shown also in ﬁgures 1 to 6, representing the kernel distribution of the eﬃciency
s c o r e sf o rt h ed i ﬀerent speciﬁcations.
5. Concluding remarks
Credit quality is an important issue in ﬁnancial systems and in the real economy.
Macroeconomic stability, competition issues and regulatory supervision all aﬀect,
and are aﬀected by, banks’ credit quality. In this study we estimate the eﬃciency
of Italian banks in the period 1998-2003 taking explicitly into account problem
loans using a directional output distance funtion. This latter allows to credit ﬁrms
for their eﬀorts to reduce bad outputs, i.e., problem loans, while at the same time
increasing the production of good outputs.
We ﬁnd that once problem loans are taken into account, the economic eﬃ-
ciency of banks increase signiﬁcantly, suggesting that a signiﬁcant aspect of bank-
ing production, credit quality, needs to be considered when evaluating banks’
performances. Further analysis is required in order to understand whether the
more eﬃcient banks, with eﬃciency measured in the “traditional” way, i.e., with-
out considering problem loans, are also more eﬃcient with respect to problem
loans reduction.
The paper can be improved and extended along diﬀerent dimensions. A pos-
sible extension, would be to investigate how to decompose credit risk between the
bad luck and the bad management hypotheses, trying also to infer how regional
diﬀerences and diﬀerent corporate governance regimes may explain the results.
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19Table 1 - Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1998 (K=535) 1999 (K=475) 2000 (K=518)
Labor (no. Workers) 411.04 1485.10 2 19124.00 203.95 543.82 3 5063.00 304.69 1083.00 2 10550.00
Labor (total costs) 23.39 0.00 0.09 1062.73 11.13 30.13 0.09 275.61 16.74 61.26 0.11 641.16
Capital 32.77 129.09 0.05 1556.47 14.84 53.01 0.05 679.32 22.30 105.26 0.02 1840.91
Purchased deposits 495.38 1896.98 0.81 20301.39 228.07 655.34 0.93 5560.78 382.52 1493.37 0.03 19797.80
Deposits 590.80 2094.01 1.66 24582.01 301.18 789.77 0.83 7529.06 476.54 1742.08 2.05 18795.62
Deposits (a vista) 480.80 1716.89 1.65 22547.42 255.22 684.07 0.05 7109.19 390.21 1415.52 1.91 16894.24
Non interest income 22.66 85.77 0.02 1113.41 8.95 28.60 0.00 279.97 16.96 74.26 0.01 1146.85
Total Loans 766.78 3142.46 1.37 47417.39 406.74 1141.20 2.61 11461.63 696.84 2637.52 2.61 28884.03
Loans net of bad loans 711.10 2900.06 1.34 42683.43 378.95 1052.30 2.25 10398.82 657.26 2495.34 2.61 28541.49
Loans net of NPL 682.22 2779.50 1.34 40397.48 364.65 1012.64 1.03 9962.28 638.32 2438.03 2.33 28347.19
Bad loans 55.68 368.60 0.00 6575.90 27.79 121.22 0.00 1884.09 39.58 233.79 0.00 4112.62
Non performing loans 84.56 476.61 0.01 7199.01 42.09 160.88 0.09 2261.09 58.52 294.69 0.05 4574.18
2001 (K=616) 2002 (K=618) 2003 (K=579)
Labor (no. Workers) 364.31 1295.56 3 20223.00 312.85 1034.59 4 16798.00 386.76 1666.62 3 33939.00
Labor (total costs) 20.13 75.87 0.11 1295.00 16.80 48.48 0.09 521.15 22.64 103.44 0.11 2156.00
Capital 26.64 94.83 0.00 1036.00 25.82 107.98 0.04 1363.92 32.41 136.42 0.07 1601.34
Purchased deposits 470.25 1780.09 0.03 32492.00 405.39 1158.11 0.60 11312.86 606.57 3324.58 0.03 73254.00
Deposits 613.67 2334.42 2.53 40147.00 554.50 1731.59 0.12 26971.15 774.62 3627.68 2.38 76922.00
Deposits (a vista) 499.12 1829.12 0.08 28433.00 466.88 1505.35 0.12 24312.58 662.28 3032.65 0.41 63123.00
Non interest income 20.43 88.59 0.02 1421.00 15.82 48.97 0.01 424.86 23.83 121.36 0.02 2604.00
Total Loans 868.79 3389.56 2.93 59572.00 794.26 2664.19 0.29 43272.38 1097.36 5288.30 4.45 112016.00
Loans net of bad loans 835.76 3274.22 2.32 57761.00 767.83 2595.05 0.08 42705.82 1056.63 5105.17 4.31 108480.00
Loans net of NPL 815.25 3208.90 2.32 56755.00 746.68 2490.97 0.08 39756.55 1029.34 4947.15 4.31 104851.00
Bad loans 33.02 157.24 0.00 2695.53 26.44 134.03 0.00 2632.07 40.74 221.66 0.01 3536.00
Non performing loans 53.53 215.14 0.06 3062.84 47.58 214.69 0.02 3515.84 68.03 372.31 0.05 7165.00
Million eurosTable 2 - Efficiency scores (Value Added Approach)
Specification Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1998 (K=535)
1. Total Loans 4.74 1.69 0 13.02
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 4.88 1.74 0 13.16
2B. Loans net of NPL 4.97 1.77 0 13.20
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.96 0.17 0 1.00
3B. Loans & NPL 0.98 0.13 0 1.00
1999 (K=475)
1. Total Loans 1.33 0.67 0 5.14
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 1.34 0.69 0 5.24
2B. Loans net of NPL 1.35 0.70 0 5.26
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.78 0.28 0 1.36
3B. Loans & NPL 0.76 0.26 0 1.00
2000 (K=518)
1. Total Loans 2.23 1.13 0 12.58
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 2.23 1.14 0 12.50
2B. Loans net of NPL 2.23 1.13 0 12.15
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.81 0.26 0 1.06
3B. Loans & NPL 0.79 0.26 0 1.00
2001 (K=616)
1. Total Loans 2.68 1.32 0 15.20
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 2.69 1.31 0 15.18
2B. Loans net of NPL 2.70 1.32 0 15.18
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.96 0.25 0 3.14
3B. Loans & NPL 0.87 0.19 0 1.00
2002 (K=618)
1. Total Loans 2.64 1.22 0 12.87
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 2.67 1.24 0 12.92
2B. Loans net of NPL 2.70 1.25 0 12.92
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.97 0.33 0 6.47
3B. Loans & NPL 0.92 0.20 0 1.15
2003 (K=579)
1. Total Loans 2.14 0.89 0 7.11
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 2.16 0.90 0 7.11
2B. Loans net of NPL 2.18 0.91 0 7.12
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.92 0.20 0 1.24
3B. Loans & NPL 0.91 0.19 0 1.00Table 3 - Efficiency scores (Intermediation Approach)
Specification Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1998 (K=535)
1. Total Loans 13.30 6.06 0.00 46.85
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 14.66 7.52 0.00 57.71
2B. Loans net of NPL 15.56 8.11 0.00 59.95
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.95 0.18 0.00 1.00
3B. Loans & NPL 0.97 0.13 0.00 1.00
1999 (K=475)
1. Total Loans 1.48 0.69 0 4.70
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 1.51 0.73 0 5.79
2B. Loans net of NPL 1.53 0.75 0 5.97
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.65 0.28 0 1.00
3B. Loans & NPL 0.65 0.24 0 1.00
2000 (K=518)
1. Total Loans 1.86 0.97 0 9.32
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 1.88 1.01 0 10.61
2B. Loans net of NPL 1.89 1.02 0 10.75
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.84 0.27 0 1.16
3B. Loans & NPL 0.82 0.26 0 1.00
2001 (K=616)
1. Total Loans 2.89 1.30 0 11.25
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 2.90 1.31 0 11.71
2B. Loans net of NPL 2.90 1.32 0 11.90
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.98 0.34 0 6.79
3B. Loans & NPL 0.85 0.19 0 0.99
2002 (K=618)
1. Total Loans 2.15 0.94 0 9.01
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 2.17 0.96 0 9.58
2B. Loans net of NPL 2.20 0.98 0 9.75
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.95 0.28 0 3.45
3B. Loans & NPL 0.88 0.22 0 1.00
2003 (K=579)
1. Total Loans 1.55 0.88 0 7.19
2A. Loans net of Bad Loan 1.60 0.93 0 8.09
2B. Loans net of NPL 1.65 0.97 0 8.61
3A. Loans & Bad Loans 0.76 0.27 0 1.07
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